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Sub-National Human Rights Institutions and Transgovernmental Networks 
 
Andrew Wolman
*
 
 
Abstract:  
Transgovernmental networks have played a prominent role in the evolution and development of 
national human rights institutions (‘NHRIs’) by promoting cooperation, best practices, and 
engagement at the international level, and providing NHRIs with legitimacy through the 
accreditation process. The role that transgovernmental networks play in the development of sub-
national human rights institutions (‘SNHRIs’), however, has yet to be examined. This article 
attempts to fill this gap by comparing networking patterns of national and sub-national human 
rights institutions. This article concludes that while SNHRIs are able to derive certain benefits 
from their membership in ombudsman associations, they are currently missing out on many of 
the other benefits that NHRIs derive from their membership in the International Coordinating 
Committee for National Institutions for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights (‘ICC’) 
and its affiliated networks. This article therefore proposes that the ICC establish a separate 
membership category for SNHRIs, with membership conditioned on compliance with a set of 
principles based on the Paris Principles, but revised so as to be applicable to sub-national bodies. 
Keywords: Sub-National Human Rights Institutions; National Human Rights Institutions; 
Transgovernmental Networks; Ombudsmen 
 
1. Introduction 
 Transgovernmental networks such as the International Coordinating Committee for 
National Institutions for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights (‘ICC’) and its affiliated 
regional networks have played a prominent role in the growth and development of NHRIs. These 
networks have incentivised NHRI conformity with best practices,
1
 facilitated NHRI exchange of 
information and coordination on particular human rights issues,
2
 encouraged and assisted in the 
development of new NHRIs,
3
 provided legitimacy and credibility through accreditation,
4
 and 
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effectively developed outlets for participating in United Nations activities.
5
 The UN General 
Assembly, Human Rights Council and treaty bodies have all, at various times, encouraged 
NHRIs to join the ICC.
6
 Over the past decade, NHRI networking has been the subject of a 
growing number of academic studies, which have generally lauded the networks’ beneficial 
effects on the evolution of NHRIs.
7
   
While the importance of networking for NHRIs is by now clear, there is far less 
understanding of the potential and actual use of networking by the sub-national counterparts of 
NHRIs, which are here termed sub-national human rights institutions (SNHRIs), and defined as 
independent non-judicial governmental institutions that possess a sub-national mandate, and 
whose mission includes the implementation of human rights norms. As with NHRIs, SNHRIs 
stand to reap significant gains from transgovernmental networking. They also have often shown 
a willingness to engage in networking with their peers at the global, regional, and in some cases 
the domestic levels. To date, however, there has been very little academic examination of the 
phenomenon of SNHRI networking. This is in part a symptom of a broader tendency among both 
scholars and practitioners to overlook sub-national human rights actors in favor of national or 
supra-national institutions.
8
  
In this article, I attempt to fill this lacuna by examining the role that transgovernmental 
networks play in the work of SNHRIs, in comparison with the role that they play for NHRIs. I 
show that while SNHRIs currently enjoy some of the benefits of transgovernmental networking, 
they generally lack access to the most influential and effective networking opportunities 
available to NHRIs, with negative implications for SNHRI effectiveness and engagement in the 
international human rights system. I conclude with prescriptive recommendations for optimising 
the potential for transgovernmental networks to improve the quality of human rights work 
undertaken by SNHRIs. 
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2. Sub-National Human Rights Institutions: An Overview 
While the term ‘sub-national human rights institution’ has been employed on occasion in 
recent years by the UN and other actors,
9
  it has not yet entered wide circulation. Thus, before 
going further, a brief introduction to the concept is warranted. In broad terms, SNHRIs can be 
considered as the sub-national counterparts of NHRIs, and the two institutional types share many 
of the same characteristics. As is the case with NHRIs, the most important distinguishing factor 
of SNHRIs is their independence: they are governmental bodies, but operate outside the general 
government agency hierarchy and (in principle, if not always in practice) do not operate under 
the instructions of any other bodies. The range of functions performed by SNHRIs varies widely 
according to local circumstances, but can include gathering information, publishing reports, 
monitoring human rights violations, conducting inquiries, proposing legislative or policy reforms, 
conducting awareness-raising campaigns, and, in many cases, receiving complaints from the 
general public and working toward the satisfactory resolution of those complaints. Within the 
broad SNHRI category are included a diverse range of institutions such as human rights 
commissions, ombudsmen, personeros, defensores del pueblo, difensores civicos, etc., as well as 
institutions that specialise in particular rights such as the rights of children or the rights of the 
disabled. SNHRIs exist at virtually all administrative levels, from cities and counties to 
provinces and vast autonomous regions.  
SNHRIs may be far less well known than NHRIs in the human rights community, but 
they have become similarly abundant on the world stage. Anti-discrimination or human rights 
commissions in many common law countries have the longest history, dating back to the 1930s 
in the United States
10
 and 1960s in Canada.
11
 Currently there are human rights commissions in 
all Australian states (and some territories), as well as in most US states, Indian states, and 
Canadian provinces.
12
 In Europe, there are several hundred regional ombudsmen and almost 
1,000 local ombudsmen in the forty-seven Council of Europe member states,
13
 all of which have 
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been established since the 1970s.
14
 While some of these are classic ombudsmen that address 
good governance issues with little attention to human rights, more and more European 
ombudsmen engage closely with human rights norms,
15
 and in central and eastern Europe most 
ombudsmen are explicitly required to do so (these are generally called human rights 
ombudsmen).
16
 In the last decades, sub-national human rights ombudsmen have also become 
widespread in Latin America. Currently there are at least 36 provincial and municipal defensores 
del pueblo in Argentina
17
 and 1,100 personeros municipales in Colombia.
18
 While SNHRIs are 
less common in Africa and Asia, their number has been growing recently; to give one example, 
South Korea now has sixteen SNHRIs, all established since 2011.
19
 
3. Transgovernmental Networks: The Conceptual Framework 
Government officials have long had formal and informal relationship with their peers in 
foreign countries. In the post-Cold War period, however, transgovernmental networks, defined as 
‘pattern[s] of regular and purposive relations among like government units working across the 
borders that divide countries from one another’, have become more common.20 These networks 
have involved a range of different types of officials, from judges to regulators to policy 
implementers, acting in many different issue areas, from human rights to financial regulation to 
antitrust enforcement. While attention has often focused on networks involving national 
government units, the increase in transgovernmental networks is also evident at the sub-national 
level, especially in areas of local interest such as environmental regulation.
21
 At the sub-national 
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level, governmental units have also formed networks with their peers within a single country, 
which are sometimes called ‘translocal’ networks.22 While translocal networks would not be 
considered ‘transgovernmental’ under the definition given above, they may in some cases be 
functionally similar. 
NHRI and SNHRI networks can be included among this broader category of 
transgovernmental networks (or translocal networks, if they involve entities within a single 
country).
23
 While NHRIs and SNHRIs act independently, they nevertheless are state sponsored 
and funded, and are established by national or sub-national constitutions, legislation or decrees.
24
 
Although NHRIs and SNHRIs are sometimes deemed ‘quasi-governmental’ because of their 
functional independence,
25
 such independence is relatively common for governmental 
participants in transgovernmental networks, and in fact earlier studies defined transgovernmental 
relations to require member sub-units to act autonomously from their governments.
26
  
Transgovernmental networks can be classified according to both the relationships that the 
networks establish and the functions that the networks perform. According to the typology 
developed by Anne-Marie Slaughter and Thomas Hale, the relationships that they establish can 
be either horizontal, vertical, or both.
27
 Horizontal networks involve actors at the same 
administrative level, whether sub-national, national or supra-national. These are most common, 
and most commonly studied. Vertical networks include actors from different governmental levels. 
While SNHRI and NHRI networks are mainly horizontal in nature, some also include vertical 
elements by including both SNHRIs and NHRIs in the same network (or even by including the 
European Ombudsman, which operates at a supra-national level). 
  Functionally, transgovernmental networks have been divided into three types: 
information networks, enforcement networks, and harmonisation networks (although it should be 
noted that many networks exercise more than one function).
28
 Information networks focus on 
exchanging information and collecting or distilling best practices through, for example, the use 
of conferences, training sessions and publication of reports. Recent research has stressed the 
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importance of networks to governmental learning and innovation because of evidence that 
officials tend to evaluate new information or policies based more on the subjective opinion of 
their peers rather than formal sources.
29
 Enforcement networks involve cooperation with the goal 
of enforcing laws that cannot be easily enforced by a single country’s enforcement apparatus. 
Harmonisation networks are aimed at promoting conformity with a single standard or set of rules. 
SNHRI and NHRI networks function in large part as information networks, however the ICC in 
particular also has a strong harmonisation function with respect to the Paris Principles. 
Looking beyond a purely functional analysis, a large body of research has highlighted the 
fact that transgovernmental networking can have other important implications for their members. 
Three of these are of particular potential importance for SNHRIs. First, membership in 
transgovernmental networks can have a positive effect on the legitimacy of their member bodies. 
According to an empirical study of transgovernmental securities networks by David Bach and 
Abraham Newman, ‘[b]oth the statistical analysis and preliminary anecdotal evidence suggest 
that newly created regulators use membership in transgovernmental networks to bolster their 
legitimacy’.30 In particular, new or insecure bodies see network membership as a pathway to 
improving their image through association with more established or respected bodies in the 
transgovernmental network setting. A similar legitimisng motive has been noted in studies of 
NHRI membership in the ICC, as will be discussed in the following section.  
Second, transgovernmental networks can promote their members’ independence. In some 
cases this is accomplished through the promulgation of non-binding guidelines that encourage 
independence, such as the Basel Core Principles on Banking Supervision or the International 
Organization of Securities Commissions principles.
31
 Elsewhere, as is the case with NHRIs in 
the ICC, membership may be conditioned on structural independence, thereby providing an 
incentive for states to establish independent NHRIs. Even without explicit support for member 
independence, transgovernmental networks can provide forums for lower level officials to 
develop their professional agendas separately from and with outside of the supervision of their 
national (or sub-national) governments. According to Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, 
transgovernmental relations can even lead to the emergence of ‘coalitions with like-minded 
agencies from other governments against elements of their own administrative structures’.32  
Third, transgovernmental networks can also have a socializing effect on their members.
33
 
In the human right field, Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks have applied their work on state 
socialisation to human rights networks. According to Goodman and Jinks, there are three distinct 
mechanisms of social influence driving state behavior: material inducement, persuasion, and 
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acculturation.
34
 Of these mechanisms, acculturation (meaning the ‘general process by which 
actors adopt the beliefs and behavioural patterns of the surrounding culture’) is of particular 
importance in explaining the impact of transgovernmental human rights networks.
35
 
Acculturation is based on the social desire to conform, a result of the socio-psychological costs 
of nonconformity (including dissonance from conduct inconsistent with an actor’s social role) 
and the socio-psychological benefits of conformity, based on ‘cognitive comfort’ from achieving 
high social status or membership in a perceived ‘in-group’.36 According to Goodman and Jinks, 
acculturation can lead to isomorphism, meaning structural similarities in organisations, even 
when underlying conditions differ widely across states.
37
 While Goodman and Jinks accept the 
thesis that membership in transgovernmental networks increases the likelihood of accepting 
international norms, they also see membership as increasing the likelihood of states being 
influenced by practices of other network members (whether or not those practices reflect 
international norms).
38
 Goodman and Jinks also pay particular attention to the implications of 
network membership rules. In brief, they find that restrictive memberships can allow 
membership to be used to confer legitimacy or ostracism (when it is denied); can strengthen 
affinity among insiders, and, where the membership is small, can enhance social conformity.
39
 
The dominant strand of recent research on transgovernmental networks, most associated 
with the work of Anne-Marie Slaughter, has taken a positive view of the potential for these 
networks to contribute to contemporary global governance. In particular, they are seen as having 
advantages over traditional international organisations in their flexibility, speed, inclusiveness, 
and ability to devote sustained attention to complex regulatory issues.
40
 According to Slaughter, 
transgovernmental networks are ‘the optimal form of organization for the Information Age’41 and 
‘the blueprint for the international architecture of the 21st century.’42 Kal Raustiala similarly 
argues that the establishment of transgovernmental networks are likely to have synergistic effects 
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with the functioning of classic international treaty regimes.
43
  Much of the research on NHRI 
networks has been similarly positive.
44
 
There have, however, been notes of caution regarding the spread of transgovernmental 
networks.
45
 Slaughter and Hale note that networks’ flexibility may render them toothless when 
strong enforcement powers are needed to sustain member cooperation.
46
 This is less relevant for 
NHRI and SNHRI networks, however, as they are not primarily intended to sustain international 
cooperation. Slaughter and Hale also highlight that transgovernmental networks can face 
legitimacy problems to the extent that they ‘empower domestic officials to act without approval 
from their domestic superiors.’47 This is sometimes characterized as a deficit of democratic 
accountability.
48
 This would not normally be considered a drawback for NHRI and SNHRI 
networks, however, as NHRIs and SNHRIs are by definition supposed to act independently of 
their home governments, and in fact derive much of their credibility from that very 
independence.
49
 
4.  NHRI Networking 
 Transgovernmental networks have played an undeniably prominent role in the 
establishment and development of NHRIs over the past two decades. NHRIs have joined two 
parallel sets of networks. First, there is a system of global and regional NHRI-specific networks 
with strong connections to the United Nations and other international actors. Second, there is a 
separate system of global and regional ombudsman networks which have weaker connections to 
other international actors and lack the legitimating qualities of a robust accreditation system. 
This section will give an overview of each of these networking systems and their implications.  
4.1 NHRI Networks 
The ICC was the first transgovernmental NHRI network to be established, in 1993.
50
 The 
ICC accredits members through an interactive and rigorous peer-review process based on an 
evaluation of compliance with the Paris Principles, a set of standards adopted by the UN General 
Assembly that provides guidelines on the competence and responsibilities of NHRIs, NHRI 
                                                          
43
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44
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independence and pluralism, and NHRI methods of operation.
51
 Although the application process 
is fundamentally based on submitted documentation, the UN, civil society groups and other 
stakeholders also can provide input to the ICC.
52
 Currently, the ICC has seventy NHRI members 
with A-status, signifying compliance with the Paris Principles.
53
 It also has accredited twenty-
five NHRIs with B status, signifying partial compliance with the Paris Principles, and ten NHRIs 
with C status, signifying non-compliance.
54
 Reaccreditation is required every five years.
55
 While 
B and C status NHRIs can participate in some ICC activities, they are not voting members and 
do not receive privileged treatment at the UN.
56
 In addition to allowing for full participation with 
in the ICC and providing an entryway for participating in the UN, A-status is widely recognised 
as a sign of institutional legitimacy and credibility
57
  
Structurally, ICC decision-making is managed by a bureau consisting of sixteen voting 
members, four each from the Americas, Africa, Europe and the Asia-Pacific.
58
 It also has 
working groups on governance and sustainable funding and a Sub-Committee on Accreditation 
(‘SCA’) made up of one voting member from each of the four regions, which reviews 
applications and makes recommendations on Paris Principles compliance to the managing 
Bureau.
59
 The ICC maintains an extremely close relationship with the UN Office of the High 
Commissioner of Human Rights (‘OHCHR’), which has been a strong advocate for the 
establishment and strengthening of NHRIs and coordination between NHRIs via the ICC.
60
 
Currently, the OHCHR in Geneva serves as the ICC secretariat and is a permanent observer to 
the SCA.
61
 
                                                          
51
 Principles Relating to the Status and Functioning of National Institutions for the Promotion and 
Protection of Human Rights, adopted 20 December 1993, GA Res 48/134, UN GAO R, 48th Sess, UN 
Doc A/RES/ 48/141 (1993) (‘Paris Principles’).  
52
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53
 ICC, ‘Chart of the Status of National Institutions’ (2014) 
<http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/NHRI/Chart_Status_NIs.pdf> accessed 15 November 2014. 
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and staff members for ombudsman-form NHRIs. Linda Reif, ‘Enhancing the Role of Ombudsman 
Institutions in the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities’, paper presented at 
International Ombudsman Institute Conference (Wellington, 2012) 15. 
54
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55
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56
 ibid 156-57. 
57
 ibid 156. 
58
 ibid 155. 
59
 ibid 156. 
60
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109. 
61
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Functionally, the ICC has five principal roles. First, as is common with 
transgovernmental networks, the ICC encourages cooperation and information sharing among its 
members, through the organisation of conferences and the promotion of regional forums.
62
 
Second, the ICC assists in the establishment of new NHRIs and capacity building for existing 
NHRIs.
63
 Third, the ICC promotes best practices, primarily by conditioning new membership on 
compliance with the Paris Principles (and suspending existing members that fall out of 
compliance).
64
 Fourth, the ICC, along with its regional affiliates, acts as a collective mouthpiece 
for NHRIs at international fora.
65
 In recent years, the ICC has helped NHRIs participate 
collectively in the negotiation of treaties and declarations through the UN system.
66
 Fifth, by 
accrediting Paris Principles-compliant NHRIs, the ICC facilitates individual NHRI engagement 
in the international human rights system. This is accomplished because A-status accreditation 
has been viewed by the UN Human Rights Council as a sufficient signal of legitimacy to entitle 
an NHRI to privileged participation.
67
 Specifically, A-accredited NHRIs (along with the ICC 
itself and its affiliated regional networks) are now permitted to make an oral statement for all 
Human Rights Council agenda items, submit documents to the Human Rights Council, and take 
separate seating in all Human Rights Council sessions.
68
  
 The ICC is supplemented at the regional level by four formally affiliated regional NHRI 
networks: the European Group of National Human Rights Institutions; the Asia Pacific Forum of 
National Human Rights Institutions (‘APF’); the Network of National Institutions for the 
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights in the Americas, and the Network of African 
National Human Rights Institutions (‘NANHRI’).69 These four networks are comprehensive and 
exclusive, in the sense that they cover all areas of the globe without overlap. With the exception 
of the NANHRI, the regional networks do not conduct their own accreditation; rather, they 
accept as voting members any NHRI in their geographical area that has received A-status 
accreditation by the ICC SCA.
70
 While the Asian, African and European networks possess 
permanent secretariats, the American group does not, despite efforts to establish one by the ICC 
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and OHCHR.
71
 The basic functions of the regional networks are quite similar to those of the ICC, 
for example the APF ‘facilitates the exchange of information between its members, forges links 
between staff in different institutions, and disseminates technological expertise’.72 The ICC has 
strongly supported the establishment and growth of these regional networks.
73
  
 Along with the ICC and its four affiliated regional networks, many NHRIs belong to one 
or more other transgovernmental NHRI networks, based on either cultural or geographic affinity. 
While not formally affiliated with the ICC, the Association of National Human Rights 
Institutions of EAC Partner States, the Arab Network for NHRIs, the Network of National 
Human Rights Institutions in West Africa, and the Southeast Asian National Human Rights 
Institutions Forum have acted as standing regional (or sub-regional) forums with regular 
meetings, exchanges, and other forms of coordination. The Southeast Asian National Human 
Rights Institutions Forum, which groups together six NHRIs from the ASEAN region, has been 
particularly active in pressuring ASEAN states to develop a robust regional human rights 
mechanism within the ASEAN system.
74
 Meanwhile, NHRI networks from countries with 
historical or linguistic commonalities have been established through the British Commonwealth 
(the Commonwealth Forum of National Human Rights Institutions) and the Organisation de la 
Francophonie (the Francophone Association of National Human Rights Institutions).
 
Finally, a 
range of less formalised transgovernmental networks have been forged between NHRIs from 
different countries. Multilateral examples include the Arab-Ibero American dialogue of National 
Human Rights Institutions and the Arab-European Human Rights Dialogue. These forms of 
inter-regional cooperation have been encouraged by the ICC.
75
  
 In recent years, a number of researchers have highlighted the importance of the ICC for 
the development and operation of NHRIs. In part, this is because the ICC opens up the path for 
individual and collective participation at the international level.
76
 Gauthier De Beco points out 
that the participation of NHRIs in international fora benefits NHRIs by increasing their visibility, 
thereby enhancing their status, and helps them to stay up to date on international developments.
77
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In part, it is also due to the ICC’s prominent role in promoting adherence to the Paris Principles. 
In particular, Meg Brodie claims that at the global level, the ICC has played a critical role in the 
international socialisation of Paris Principle norms through its accreditation process.
78
 Brodie 
argues that by conditioning membership on compliance with the Paris Principles, the ICC has 
defined the boundaries of a collective identity and helped mobilise pressure for compliance from 
both above and below.
79
 Brodie claims that ICC membership can in turn provide legitimacy by 
‘symbolic validation’ of NHRIs.80 Sonia Cardenas also notes that by publicly acknowledging 
Paris Principles compliance through awarding membership, the ICC helps legitimise NHRIs, 
both in the eyes of their domestic constituents and in the eyes of the international community.
81
 
Other scholars have focused their research on the impact of regional NHRI networks. For 
example, Gauthier de Beco analysed European NHRI networks, finding that regional cooperation 
allows for greater information exchange on issues of common concern and helps strengthen 
NHRI relationship with regional bodies such as the Commissioner for Human Rights of the 
Council of Europe.
82
 Cardenas and others have shown that the regional networks have in some 
cases gone beyond the ICC in generating new standards, by issuing resolutions, commission 
reports, and developing region-specific jurisprudence.
83
 At the regional level, the APF has been 
the subject of particularly thorough study. Andrea Durbach, Andrew Byrnes, and Catherine 
Renshaw showed that in many cases the APF has facilitated the establishment and development 
of NHRIs.
84
 This was supplemented by further analysis by the same authors, demonstrating that 
the APF membership application and review procedures ‘have been reasonably effective in 
moving NHRIs towards greater compliance with the Paris Principles norms– at least as a formal 
matter – and in reinforcing the role of existing members in enforcing those shared standards’.85 
Vitit Muntarbhorn has highlighted the norm-creation role of the APF through the Advisory 
Council of Jurists, as well as its role as a cooperative forum in the absence of other options for 
human rights regionalisation in the Asia-Pacific.
86
 In issue-specific case studies, Suraina Pasha 
found the APF’s provision of education and training to Asian NHRIs to be significant87 and 
Renshaw found that the APF had advanced the acceptance by NHRIs of standards related to 
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human rights and sexual orientation, creating the expectation that NHRIs would then engage in a 
discourse with state actors on related issues.
88
 According to Renshaw, networks like the APF 
‘represent a significant, and already present, force for the implementation of human rights’.89 
Among NHRI researchers, there have also been notes of caution regarding the value of 
networks. Cardenas, for example, states that while NHRI networks seem to be relatively efficient 
and legitimate modes of human rights governance, their formation ‘signals a pooling of resources 
and power [and] potentially an entrenchment of state control over the human rights agenda’.90 
Peter Rosenblum has argued that there are profound limitations in the ability of the ICC to ensure 
that its NHRI members comply with a set of high standards.
91
 Despite these caveats, however, it 
is fair to conclude that the general tenor of research on NHRI networking has been quite positive 
regarding their contribution to NHRI development and Paris Principles compliance.  
4.2 Ombudsman Networks  
In addition to NHRI-specific networks, most ombudsman-type NHRIs have also joined a 
separate set of ombudsman networks.
92
 These networks also exist at the global, regional, and 
sub-regional levels. At the global level, the International Ombudsman Institute (‘IOI’) has been 
the most prominent organisation bringing together independent ombudsman institutions since its 
founding in 1978.
93
 The IOI focuses its work on training, research, and regional subsidies for 
projects, in addition to organising periodic conferences.
94
 Since 2009, the Austrian Ombudsman 
Board has hosted the IOI Secretariat (which had previously been located at the University of 
Alberta).
95
 The Austrian Ombudsman Board also provides the majority of the IOI’s funding.96 
As is the case with NHRI networks, there is also a relatively comprehensive set of 
regional ombudsman associations, comprised of the European Network of Ombudsmen, African 
Ombudsman and Mediators Association, Asian Ombudsman Association, Ibero-American 
Federation of Ombudsmen (which also has members from Spain and Portugal), and Pacific 
Ombudsman Alliance. As with NHRI associations, these ombudsman networks are 
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supplemented by additional associations based on cultural or sub-regional (and occasionally 
bilateral) groupings, including the Arab Ombudsman Association, the Association of 
Mediterranean Ombudsmen, the Association des Ombudsmans et des Médiateurs de la 
Francophonie, the Australia and New Zealand Ombudsman Association, and the Ombudsman 
Association (formerly the British and Irish Ombudsman Association). Of these regional and sub-
regional groups, the Ibero-American Federation of Ombudsman has been particularly active, and 
according to some accounts has a history of tensions with the ‘competing’ Latin American NHRI 
network.
97
  
Ombudsman networks differ from NHRI networks in several ways. First, as their names 
suggest, ombudsman networks are focused on ombudsman-type institutions, with few if any 
commission-type members.
98
 In contrast, NHRI networks include both ombudsman and 
commissions. Second, ombudsman networks are not solely focused on human rights issues, as 
ombudsman institutions have traditionally been more concerned with issues of maladministration 
and corruption (as many ombudsmen still are). In fact, with the exception of the Ibero-American 
Federation of Ombudsmen, ombudsman associations tend to be dominated by classical 
ombudsmen with little tradition of human rights implementation.
99
 Third, the membership of 
ombudsman networks is not based on ICC accreditation or any other peer review process based 
on a set of best practices. While membership practices at the regional networks vary, IOI 
membership decisions are made by the IOI Executive Committee based on the recommendation 
of the Secretary General; voting membership is contingent on an ombudsman’s investigation of 
complaints, functional independence, and compliance with a set of IOI principles.
100
 In practice, 
IOI membership is not seen as a signal of quality or independence that can lend ombudsman 
offices any meaningful legitimacy. Fourth, as will be discussed in further depth below, 
ombudsman associations commonly group together both NHRIs and SNHRIs (and in a few cases 
include a supra-national ombudsman – the European Ombudsman – for good measure). NHRI 
associations, on the other hand, generally exclude SNHRIs. Fifth, ombudsman networks tend to 
have far less interaction with international and regional organisations such as the UN,
101
 although 
the IOI Secretary General has in recent years worked to increase their international 
engagement.
102
 For example, the IOI applied to the UN Economic and Social Council in May 
2013 for consultative status as an NGO.
103
 However this would not lead to the privileged access 
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granted by the UN human rights system to the ICC (and regional NHRI associations such as the 
APF). Connected to this point, it is worth noting that, in contrast with membership in the ICC, 
membership in ombudsman networks does not convey any privileged status at the UN.  
There has so far been little research directed at the implications of ombudsman 
associations on NHRI growth and development (or even, for that matter, on ombudsman growth 
and development), although their role in standard-setting and information sharing has been 
highlighted, at least in the European context.
104
 In part, this relative lack of interest is no doubt 
due to the generally more limited ambitions of ombudsman networks: as discussed, they have not 
attempted to spread a particular code of best practices (like the Paris Principles) or promote 
member interests before international bodies. The paucity of research could also reflect academic 
research priorities, that tend to favor explicitly ‘human rights’ focused institutions, and 
underemphasise the role of administrative law bodies (such as classical ombudsmen) in 
implementing human rights, whether at the domestic or international levels.
105
 
5. SNHRIs and Transgovernmental Networks 
 Transgovernmental networks present tempting prospects to SNHRIs, for much the same 
reason that they have been embraced by NHRIs. These networks can promote best practices, 
provide capacity-building assistance, and facilitate inter-body cooperation, and access to the 
international system. These various benefits would be particularly important for SNHRIs given 
their typically small size and low budgets, which in many cases would make it difficult for 
SNHRIs to independently access training or develop norms, or to engage with international 
mechanisms. In theory, transgovernmental networks would also be able to help legitimise fragile 
institutions and socialise SNHRI into desired institiutional norms, as has taken place with NHRIs 
in their networks. To date, however, SNHRIs have, with a few exceptions, not been made 
welcome at NHRI-specific networks. They have been accepted to a greater degree at ombudsman 
networks, however, and in many countries have initiated their own translocal networks that bring 
together multiple SNHRIs from a single country. 
5.1 SNHRIs in NHRI-Specific Networks 
 Since its inception, the ICC and affiliated NHRI networks have struggled with the 
question of whether to accredit and allow membership to SNHRIs.
106
 On the one hand, sub-
national bodies are – perhaps by definition – not NHRIs. The Paris Principle repeatedly uses 
terms such as ‘national institution’ and ‘national legislation’ and states that NHRIs should pay 
attention to human rights violations in ‘any part of the country.’107 Bearing in mind the strong 
influence of UNHCHR in setting up and operating the ICC, there may also have been reluctance 
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to deal with sub-national entities, which have traditionally been absent from the halls of New 
York and Geneva.
108
 On the other hand, decentralisation and self-government considerations 
have in many countries led to the establishment of strong and internationally active SNHRIs in 
systems where it is politically difficult or impossible for an NHRI to oversee government actions 
throughout the country.  
 In recent years, the ICC has dealt with applications from SNHRIs in a haphazard and 
inconsistent manner, leaving a lack of clarity as to underlying policy. The ICC’s first reaction to 
SNHRI membership applications was to grant SNHRIs non-voting status. Thus, in 2000 the 
Hong Kong Equal Opportunities Commission was given C-status accreditation, despite being 
fairly well respected by observers.
109
 A year later, the Northern Ireland Human Rights 
Commission was granted B-status, while in 2007 the Oficina del Procurador del Ciudadano del 
Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico was given C-status. These outcomes have been criticised 
by some; from the outside C-status suggests a lack of independence or effectiveness (as with, for 
example, the Iran Human Rights Commission), but in fact these SNHRIs were basically being 
denied voting membership solely due to their subnational mandates.
110
 
 While the Hong Kong Equal Opportunities Commission and Oficina del Procurador del 
Ciudadano del Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico have maintained their C-status, the 
Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission was upgraded to A-status upon re-accreditation in 
2006. A few years later, the British Equality and Human Rights Commission (which is mandated 
to address English issues and limited Scottish matters, but does not cover Northern Ireland) was 
given A-status, and finally the Scottish Human Rights Commission was given A-status in 2010, 
although all three bodies were asked to share a single vote.
111
 In 2008 this result was justified in 
section 6.6 of the ICC’s General Observations, which stated that ‘[i]n very exceptional 
circumstances’ multiple national institutions could seek ICC accreditation, provided that they 
had the written consent of the state government and a written agreement regarding rights and 
duties as an ICC member, which included arrangements for participation in the international 
human rights system.
112
 In addition, the state must be a UN member.
113
 In these circumstances 
the institution would have only one speaking right, one voting right, and one ICC Bureau 
member, if elected.
114
  
The issue of SNHRI accreditation was once again brought to the fore in 2011-2012 with 
the application by the Office of the Bermuda Ombudsman, which was eventually declined by the 
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SCA. The SCA at this time took a strict attitude against SNHRIs, stating that ‘Article 10 of the 
ICC statute clearly refers to applications for accreditation from “national” human rights 
institutions…a “national” institution is an institution established by a nation state of the United 
Nations.’115 While this denial was perhaps not surprising, the justification used only complicated 
the issue: rather than analyzing compliance with the section 6.6 conditions elaborated earlier, the 
SCA seemed to be introducing a separate threshold test of whether an institution was established 
by a UN member nation-state or not (bringing into question the UK exception). More recently, 
both the Mexico City Human Rights Commission and the City of Buenos Aires Human Rights 
Commission have inquired about ICC membership eligibility, but were informed that they would 
not be allowed to seek accreditation.
116
 
Finally, although it would not normally be considered sub-national, it is worth noting that 
the Palestinian Independent Commission for Citizens’ Rights received A-status accreditation 
(with reservations) in 2005 and A-status (without reservation) in 2009 despite Palestine not being 
a UN member state at either time.
117
 This may be a sui generis situation, but it nevertheless 
seems to bring into question the emphasis on UN membership in both the SCA’s Bermuda 
decision and section 6.6 of the ICC’s General Recommendations. The issue of UN membership 
may arise again in the near future, as some officials in both Kosovo and Taiwan are reportedly 
eager to establish ICC-accredited NHRIs.
118
 
 Similar SNHRI membership issues were (inconsistently) addressed in the past by the 
regional networks, but this is no longer a significant issue, since the regional NHRI networks 
now simply accept as voting members those NHRIs that have been given A-status by the ICC 
(with the exception of the NANHRI).
119
 The Francophone Association of National Human 
Rights Institutions is the one other NHRI network to currently struggle with SNHRI membership; 
while its general policy is to only admit NHRIs with A-level accreditation from the ICC as 
voting members, the Association made an exception for Quebec’s Commission des droits de la 
personne et des droits de la jeunesse, giving it full membership, even though it is not accredited 
by the ICC.
120
 Two other Canadian SNHRIs (the Yukon Human Rights Commission and the 
New Brunswick Human Rights Commission) were granted non-voting associated member 
status.
121
 
5.2 SNHRIs in Ombdusman Networks 
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 While SNHRIs have – with a few exceptions – not been fully accepted in NHRI-specific 
networks, they have been made much more welcome in the existing system of ombudsman 
networks, which generally accept SNHRIs alongside national-level ombudsman institutions.
122
 
At the global level, for example, the IOI has 63 subnational-level members out of a total of 164 
member institutions.
123
 At the regional level, the percent of sub-national members varies widely. 
Sub-national institutions make up the majority at the European Network of Ombudsmen and 
Ibero-American Federation of Ombudsmen, where, respectively, 60 out of 89
124
 and 84 out of 
103
125
 member institutions have sub-national mandates. In both cases, all or nearly all member 
SNHRIs are from autonomous regions or provinces (and their equivalent such as cantons and 
länder), rather than municipalities. On the other hand, the Asian Ombudsman Association has 
only nine subnational-level members out of twenty-nine institutions.
126
 The Pacific Ombudsman 
Alliance has one sub-national member (the New South Wales Ombudsman) out of a total of nine 
member institutions.
127
 The Association of Mediterranean Ombudsman has a membership 
restricted to national institutions.
128
 
5.3 SNHRIs in Other Transgovernmental Networks 
While many SNHRIs have ombudsman (or human rights ombudsman) forms, there are 
also SNHRIs with a range of other institutional types. In common law countries, equality or 
human rights commissions predominate, while other localities have more idiosyncratic or local 
forms. There are far fewer transgovernmental networking opportunities for these other 
institutional types, but some exceptions exist. In North America, for example, the International 
Association of Official Human Rights Agencies is mostly made up of human rights commission-
type members from sub-national jurisdictions in the United States, Canada and Bermuda.
129
 
Meanwhile, in Europe the European Network of Ombudspersons for Children includes children’s 
                                                          
122
 The Ibero-American Federation of Ombudsmen, for example, explicitly welcomes member institutions 
from the national, state, regional, autonomy and provincial levels. Federación Iberoamericana del 
Ombudsman, ‘Qué es la FIO’ <http://www.portalfio.org/inicio/pagina-principal/que-es-la-fio.html> 
accessed 15 November 2014. 
123
 IOI, ‘IOI Directory 2014’ (n 98).  
124
 European Network of Ombudsmen, ‘Regional Ombudsmen’ 
<http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/atyourservice/regionalombudsmen.faces> accessed 15 November 
2014. 
125
 Federación Iberoamericana del Ombudsman, ‘Miembros de la FIO’ 
<http://www.portalfio.org/inicio/ombudsman-pais.html> accessed 15 November 2014.  
126
 Asian Ombudsman Association, ‘Heads of Member Institutions’ 
<http://asianombudsman.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=182&Itemid=147> 
accessed 15 November 2014. 
127
 Pacific Ombudsman Alliance, ‘About the Pacific Ombudsman Alliance, 
<http://www.pacificombudsman.org/about/index.html> accessed 15 November 2014. 
128
 Association of Mediterranean Ombudsmen, ‘Members’ List’ <http://www.ombudsman-
med.org/admin/ang/download_ang/upload/MembersAOM.pdf> accessed 15 November 2014. 
129
 International Association of Official Human Rights Agencies, ‘Human/Civil Rights Organizations’ 
<http://www.iaohra.org/members/> accessed 15 November 2014. 
19 
 
rights ombudspersons and commissions from mostly national jurisdictions from across the 
continent, along with a handful of sub-national members.
130
 
5.4 SNHRIs in Translocal Networks 
 While NHRI networks necessarily involve multiple countries, this need not be the case 
with SNHRI networking. In many countries, domestic translocal networks have been established, 
and constitute the most important networking fora.Examples include the Australian Council of 
Human Rights Agencies, the Canadian Association of Statutory Human Rights Agencies, the 
Associação Brasileira de Ouvidores / Ombudsmen, the Federación Nacional de Personeros de 
Colombia, the Associazione Nazionale dei Difensori Civici (Italy), and the Asociación 
Defensores del Pueblo de la República Argentina. In a number of cases, NHRIs have taken the 
lead in establishing formal networks or periodic meetings with the various SNHRIs in their home 
country.
131
 In addition, domestic SNHRI networking associations have also been established at 
the sub-national level; examples from the United States include the Massachusetts Association of 
Human Rights Commissions, the League of Minnesota Human Rights Commissions, and the 
California Association of Human Relations Organisations.  
6. Implications 
 As the previous sections indicate, there are significant differences in the degree of 
networking opportunities available to NHRIs and SNHRIs. NHRIs have access to the ICC, as 
long as they are found to be compliant with the Paris Principles. NHRIs also have access to 
regional NHRI networks and in some cases subregional or inter-regional NHRI networks. Many 
NHRIs also are members of global and regional networks of ombudsmen.  SNHRIs, on the other 
hand, have – with a few significant exceptions – been denied access to the ICC and regional 
NHRI networks. Ombudsman-form SNHRIs often have access to ombudsman networks, 
however the level of their participation varies significantly by region and participation is very 
rare for municipal ombudsmen. Commission-form SNHRIs, on the other hand, usually lack any 
transgovernmental networking opportunities. In some countries, SNHRIs have access to 
domestic networking opportunities.  
 There are tangible implications to these conclusion. First of all, SNHRIs have fewer 
options than NHRIs (and in the case of non-ombudsman types, sometimes no options) to receive 
the information-sharing, cooperation, and standard-setting benefits of networking. According to 
Slaughter, this will, all else being equal, lead to reduced convergence with international 
standards and lesser international cooperation.
132
 Second, SNHRIs do not have an effective 
group voice at the UN or other international bodies, because the IOI has only minimal 
engagement with international organisations, while the ICC and regional NHRI associations 
participate much more fully in international and regional organisations. Third, individual 
SNHRIs have less of an external incentive to adopt best practices, because their membership in 
international networks (and concomitant international legitimation) does not depend on them 
                                                          
130
 Sub-national members include the Flemish Children’s Rights Commissioner, the Ombudsman for 
Children of Republika Srpska, and the Children’s Commissioner for Wales. European Network for 
Ombudspersons of Children, ‘ENOC Members’ <http://enoc.eu/?page_id=210 > accessed 30 March 2015. 
131
 Wolman, ‘Relationship between National and Sub-National Human Rights Institutions’ (n 12) 456. 
132
 Slaughter, ‘New World Order’ (n 20) 24. 
20 
 
doing so. Fourth, network-based acculturation forces that have been leading to isomorphism 
around a Paris Principle-based model in NHRIs will be more likely to lead to isomorphism 
around a classical ombudsman-based model for those SNHRIs that participate in ombudsman 
networks. Fifth, individual SNHRIs will in many cases be unable to robustly participate in 
international mechanisms or the UN, because the UN only awards privileged status to bodies that 
have been accredited by the ICC, and the ICC does not award A-status to SNHRIs (with the 
exception of UK bodies). 
 These implications are, I would argue, largely negative for SNHRIs. SNHRIs are often 
weak bodies, in need of the legitimation that transgovernmental networks can provide, and that 
the ICC has, according to Brodie and Cardenas, provided to NHRIs through the accreditation 
process.
133
 SNHRIs also tend to have small staffs and budgets, making it difficult for them to 
access best practice information, training, and capacity-building assistance without membership 
in a network dedicated to the provision of those services. In short, SNHRIs would be stronger 
and more capable if they had access to appropriate networks. In addition, SNHRIs sometimes 
(but certainly not always) desire to directly participate in international mechanisms, and would 
be able to provide helpful perspectives beyond those already contributed by NHRIs and other 
institutional types.
134
 Without networks facilitating this participation, these perspectives are lost. 
Finally, SNHRIs would be able to more effectively promote and protect human rights if their 
networking environment socialised them into a human rights culture (as is the case in NHRI 
networks) rather than the good administration culture more evident in ombudsman associations. 
The following section will argue that SNHRIs can most effectively attain the full positive effects 
of networking if the ICC were to inaugurate a separate institutional category for SNHRIs, with 
membership based on accreditation under a set of standards based upon (but not identical to) the 
Paris Principles. 
7. ICC and SNHRI Membership 
 There are a range of possible avenues for SNHRIs to access greater benefits of 
networking. One solution would be to create one or more new SNHRI networks not based on 
traditional ombudsman associations. Another option would be to transform existing ombudsman 
associations into explicitly human rights-focused networks. Neither of these developments seem 
likely. The formation of new transgovernmental SNHRI networks would be costly, time-
consuming, and extremely unlikely to convey legitimacy or achieve access to the UN. Efforts to 
transform ombudsman networks into SNHRI networks would require complete shifts in their 
mandates, and current members who are not SNHRIs would presumably object to such a shift.
135
 
In any case, these networks would not provide legitimacy or UN access in the way that the ICC 
does for NHRIs.  
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Other options would promote greater opportunities for SNHRIs to indirectly access 
networking benefits. One possibility would be for the ICC and other influential actors to 
encourage NHRIs to coordinate more closely with SNHRIs in their jurisdictions by, for example, 
conveying SNHRI concerns in those international forums that NHRIs have access to because of 
their ICC accreditation. This has been attempted in a few countries, with limited success, and in 
any case would only in small part allow SNHRIs to benefit from existing networks.
136
 Another 
indirect option would be to increase coordination and cooperation between the IOI and ICC, and 
in fact this is already occurring, with the IOI, for example, engaging with the ICC in order to 
address perceived difficulties that ombudsman institutions face in the ICC accreditation 
process.
137
 However, this type of indirect relationship between SNHRIs and the ICC (mediated 
by the IOI) would likewise convey few of the networking benefits discussed above.  
 I would argue, therefore, that the only practical way for SNHRIs to attain the same level 
of networking benefits as NHRIs would be through membership in the ICC, given that the ICC 
has a long-standing focus on human rights capacity-building, an unparalleled ability to convey 
legitimacy through the accreditation process, a respected voice in international forums, and the 
ability to provide a privileged status at the UN through membership. Unfortunately, however, 
efforts to integrate SNHRIs into the existing ICC system to date have been haphazard and 
inconsistent, hobbled by the undeniable fact that the Paris Principles were not drafted with 
SNHRIs in mind. I would propose a solution that has yet to be tried; namely, the establishment 
of a separate membership category for SNHRIs at the ICC. This membership category would 
admit accredited SNHRIs based on their conformance with a set of standards derived from the 
Paris Principles, but revised so as to assure their applicability to sub-national institutions.  
It would of course be challenging to work out all the details necessary for this proposal to 
be successful. While it is not possible to anticipate all the logistical and substantive issues of 
SNHRI membership in the scope of this paper, it is clear that questions regarding SNHRI voting 
power and representation at the ICC Bureau would have to be resolved, and the ICC Statute 
would have to be revised so as to incorporate SNHRIs as a new membership category.
138
 Similar 
regulatory and administrative changes would be required of the affiliated regional NHRI 
networks, assuming that they followed suit in the recognition of a new class of SNHRI members 
(as would be likely, given that the regional networks have to date tended to follow the ICC’s lead 
on membership issues). Opposition could be expected from certain quarters, potentially 
including the established ombudsman networks (which would risk losing some of their relevance) 
and certain states that are not used to allowing sub-national entities a voice at the international 
level.  
Perhaps the most contentious aspect of this proposal would be the necessity of drafting a 
new set of principles (based on the Paris Principles) to apply to SNHRIs. The drafting process 
would have to be appropriately inclusive and transparent, incorporating the input of SNHRIs 
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themselves, as well as civil society organisations, NHRIs, and UNHCHR. While the substance of 
these new principles would emerge from stakeholder discussions, they would ideally differ only 
slightly from the existing Paris Principles. For example, they should not be phrased in language 
that refers to the ‘country’, the ‘nation’ or ‘national’ institutions. In addition, the new set of 
principles should probably omit the requirement to promote new treaty ratification, which is 
arguably more appropriate for NHRIs, given that sub-national entities cannot ratify treaties. The 
new principles should also provide guidance for coordination between SNHRIs and NHRIs, 
where applicable. For the most part, however, the guidelines from the Paris Principles can simply 
be integrated into the new set of principles; minimising changes would be the best strategy to 
preserve the high degree of legitimacy and credibility that has accumulated around the Paris 
Principles over the years.  
There would be several advantages to a proposed new membership category for SNHRIs. 
SNHRIs would be incentivised to comply with a set of best practice principles in order to receive 
accreditation by a respected body (with the legitimisation which that implies). Those SNHRIs 
that successfully attained membership would receive acculturation in a human rights-focused 
environment, would have a respected group voice in the UN, and would potentially be eligible 
for greater participation in regional and global fora, as is currently the case for accredited NHRIs. 
In addition, the creation of a new avenue for ICC membership for SNHRIs would reduce the 
pressure on strongly federal states to adopt NHRIs that are ill-suited to their political system, 
merely to conform with Paris Principle guidelines that presume that a unitary NHRI is necessary, 
regardless of the particularities of a country’s internal system.  
There would also, of course, be certain dangers inherent in establishing a separate ICC 
membership category for SNHRIs. Some might fear that adding a new membership category 
would incrementally decrease the prestige or legitimacy associated with membership. There 
might also be a danger that opening up the Paris Principles for review – even in the narrow 
context of SNHRIs – might lead to a weakening of standards, especially if sovereign state 
representatives played the major role in the renegotiation process. This has indeed been a 
common fear whenever advocates have suggested renegotiating the Paris Principles in the NHRI 
context.
139
 In this case, however, the Paris Principles would remain the same for NHRIs with no 
possibility of being watered down (or strengthened). While it is conceivable that the new set of 
principles applicable to SNHRIs would end up with provisions that are weaker than those in the 
Paris Principles, most stakeholders (namely SNHRIs, NHRIs, and OHCHR) would be unlikely to 
favor such an outcome.  
A potentially more serious issue would be the prospect that if SNHRIs became more 
prominent actors at the international level through the influence of the ICC (ie, by gaining a 
voice at UN proceedings), it would result in incrementally less time and attention for other actors 
such as NHRIs and NGOs.
140
 This may occur, if one assumes that international bodies such as 
the UN Human Rights Council have only a limited amount of time to spend on analyzing country 
practices, and that this time is currently fully occupied by other actors. However, if one believes 
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that SNHRI have a valuable perspective that can add to what is already being discussed, then this 
would not necessarily be a negative outcome. 
Others might object that even if this proposal was workable, most SNHRIs would be 
unlikely to apply for ICC membership. In fact, this is a possibility. Many SNHRIs are lightly 
staffed, with small budgets and little interest or capability of effectively engaging with the UN or 
peers in other countries. Other SNHRIs, however, have already demonstrated a desire to join the 
ICC, or otherwise to engage with their peers at the international level.
141
 A number of SNHRIs 
have already expressed a desire to attain the standards laid out in the Paris Principles, despite the 
principles not being drafted with SNHRIs in mind.
142
 In any case, a small or selective 
membership is not necessarily a negative; after all, even at the national level, some NHRIs have 
not applied for membership in the ICC.  
8. Conclusion 
 As this article has shown, while some ombudsman-type SNHRIs actively participate in 
transgovernmental networks, there are many other SNHRIs that do not engage with their peers in 
other countries. Even those SNHRIs that have joined ombudsman networks do not have access to 
the same benefits of transgovernmental networks that NHRIs enjoy through the ICC and its 
affiliated networks. This article proposes the establishment of a new form of membership for the 
ICC, which would be accessible to SNHRIs. This would open up new avenues of international 
participation for SNHRIs, allow them to interact and learn from their peers, and provide them 
with greater legitimacy. In order to credibly join NHRIs at the ICC, however, SNHRIs would 
have to comply with a set of guidelines similar (although not identical) to the Paris Principles. 
This article therefore proposes the drafting of a new set of principles that can effectively provide 
guidance for SNHRIs while remaining true to the spirit of the Paris Principles.  
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